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Do I Have to Say More? When Mediation 
Confidentiality Clashes with the Duty to Report* 
I. BEGINNINGS 
Joe Smith is an experienced mediator and well-respected attorney in 
his county.1  He usually mediates divorce settlements, priding himself on a 
nearly eighty percent settlement rate.2  Smith was recently hired to mediate 
a settlement between a couple that was heading for an ugly court battle.  
The attorney for the husband, a younger attorney who clearly looked up to 
Smith, confided in Smith that he had advised the husband to conceal from 
the wife the existence of a mutual fund account that was performing ex-
tremely well.  The attorney joked with Smith about how he was “putting 
one over on” the wife, and that the mutual fund had been transferred into 
the name of a paralegal in order to avoid detection by the wife or her attor-
ney. 
Smith was concerned about whether the husband was mediating in 
good faith and counseled the husband and his attorney on the importance of 
open dialogue and of behaving with integrity toward the wife.  Eventually, 
however, Smith, unable to persuade the husband or his attorney to be open 
about the mutual fund, withdrew from the mediation, citing to the wife an 
unspecified conflict of interest.3  With a second mediator, a settlement was 
eventually reached without the existence of the mutual fund ever coming to 
light.  Some months later, the wife’s attorney, by chance, overheard the 
husband’s attorney talking about the settlement and did some investigative 
 
* This Comment would not have been written without the insights provided by Professor 
Mark Morris of the North Carolina Central University School of Law.  The Author is in-
debted to him and to Mr. Frank Laney, Chief Mediator for the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, 
for their help and generosity.  Any and all errors are the Author’s alone. 
 1. This is an entirely hypothetical fact situation, although some general details were 
taken from N.C. DISPUTE RESOL. COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. 10-16 (2010), available at 
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/DRC/Documents/compliedaor_10-16.pdf; 
OR. STATE BAR BD. OF GOVERNORS, FORMAL OP. NO. 2005-167 (2005); and FLA. MEDIATOR 
QUALIFICATIONS ADVISORY PANEL, ADVISORY OP. 95-005 (1995). 
 2. The settlement rate for mediated divorce and custody actions ranges between sixty 
and eighty percent.  Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of the 
Mediative Art: A Guide to Institutionalizing Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L. REV. 885, 
919 (1997). 
 3. Withdrawal is what the ethics opinions cited supra note 1 would tell Smith to do. 
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work, uncovering the mutual fund and the plot to keep it secret.  The wife 
filed an action with the court to have the settlement set aside, a complaint 
against the husband’s attorney for fraud, and a separate complaint against 
Smith under Rule 8.3 of the state’s Code of Professional Responsibility 
(the Code).4  This Comment will explore the mediation rules and Codes of 
the various states. 
Without mediation—and other forms of alternative dispute resolu-
tion—the civil justice system in this country would surely collapse under 
its own weight.5  Legal scholars from Chief Justice Warren Burger down 
have noted that the adversarial process should not be the only way to re-
solve disputes, and indeed, it is not suitable for many people.6  Recognizing 
this, many states have made attempts at alternate dispute resolution (ADR) 
necessary to continuation of lawsuits.7 
The demand, therefore, for trained ADR professionals is high.  The 
American Arbitration Association lists approximately 8,000 arbitrators and 
mediators in its network;8 there are over 1,200 certified Superior Court me-
 
 4. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2010) (“A lawyer who knows that 
another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a 
substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects shall inform the appropriate professional authority.”).  This rule is referred to 
in several amusing ways by practicing attorneys, one of the best being the “duty to squeal.”  
Pamela A. Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Intolerable Conflict for 
Attorney Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation Confidentiality and the Duty to 
Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REV. 715, 741 (1997). 
 5. For the period July 1, 2009–June 30, 2010, a total of 5,319 of the 8,691 cases filed 
in North Carolina Superior Court were sent to mediation—of which, 2,772 (43%) settled.  
2009–2010 N.C. DISPUTE RESOL. COMM’N REP. 10 (2010).  Since 2007, the U.S. Department 
of Justice has saved 2,869 months (or over 239 years) of litigation time by using some form 
of alternate dispute resolution.  Alternative Dispute. Resolution at the Department of Justice, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/odr/doj-statistics.htm (last updated Dec. 
2010).  In 2010 alone the Department saved more than $11 million in litigation and discov-
ery expenses.  Id. 
 6. Burger noted that: 
[W]e must move away from total reliance on the adversary contest for resolving 
all disputes.  For some disputes, trials will be the only means, but for many, trials 
by the adversary contest must in time go the way of the ancient trial by battle and 
blood.  Our system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, too inefficient for a 
truly civilized people.  To rely on the adversary process as the principal means of 
resolving conflicting claims is a mistake that must be corrected. 
Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, 70 A.B.A. J. 62, 66 (1984). 
 7. For example, all civil actions filed in North Carolina Superior Court must be medi-
ated before a court date will be calendared.  N.C. GEN STAT. § 7A-38.1(a) (2009). 
 8. Statement of Ethical Principles for the American Arbitration Association, an ADR 
Provider Organization, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22036 (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2011). 
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diators in North Carolina.9  Most states allow both attorney and nonattor-
ney mediators, requiring only that certified mediators have professional 
qualifications and complete mediation training.10 
Problems arise when the attorneys for the parties in the mediation be-
have in ways that would, in a litigation setting, lead to professional sanc-
tions.  How the states should handle this situation is the subject of quite 
heated debate. 
One side of the debate holds that attorney–mediators are attorneys 
first.  They are still bound by the same Code that they abide by as attor-
neys, and these responsibilities cannot be put on hold.  Those who adhere 
to this side believe that the Code protects the integrity of the profession, 
because violations harm the profession as a whole.  As another part of their 
argument, the attorney–mediator would note that reporting attorney misbe-
havior under Rule 8.3 is (generally) mandatory;11 if a mediator, such as 
Smith, does not report infractions that he has knowledge of, he opens him-
self up to sanctions.12 
The other side of the debate holds that attorney–mediators are, at that 
moment, mediators, not attorneys.  The mediator is not at the mediation as 
a referee, but as a facilitator who is working to get the best resolution for 
the parties.  Forcing mediators to wear two hats is unfair, they argue, to 
both the mediator and the participants.  Forcing attorney–mediators to be 
on the alert for every infraction the parties may have committed in order to 
protect themselves from liability is not conducive to a good process or re-
sult.  It also means that attorney–mediators have additional responsibilities 
that nonattorney–mediators do not, leading to discrepancies in how these 
two groups of identically trained mediators operate. 
This Comment surveys the conflict at the state level and proposes a 
solution.13  In the first section, there will be a short discussion of mediation 
 
 9. 2009–2010 N.C. DISPUTE RESOL. COMM’N REP. 4 (2010). 
 10. See generally State Requirements for Mediators, MEDIATION TRAINING INST. INT’L, 
http://www.mediationworks.com/medcert3/staterequirements.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 
2011).  But see Poly Software Int’l v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1493 (D. Utah 1995) (defining 
“mediator” as “an attorney who agrees to assist parties in settling a legal dispute”). 
 11. In some states, reporting is not mandatory.  See infra Part III.C.2. 
 12. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 1 (2010) (“Lawyers are subject 
to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Con-
duct . . . .”). 
 13. My focus here is primarily on mediation in civil litigation (civil mediation).  Media-
tion occurs in many other settings (criminal law, family law, worker’s compensation, em-
ployment disputes, to name but a few), and the issues discussed here are no less relevant in 
those areas than they are here.  However, in the interests of brevity and clarity, I have cho-
sen to discuss only the civil arena. 
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and the clash between the mediation rules and the Code.  In the second sec-
tion, the Comment will discuss the choices that are available to the states in 
designing mediation and professional conduct rules.  This section will ex-
plore the interplay between the two sets of rules in more detail, paying 
close attention to what the rules allow and what they forbid.  Finally, a 
concluding section will discuss the competing, important interests and a 
proposed path forward. 
II. SOME BACKGROUND 
A.   An Introduction to Mediation 
Mediation is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a] method of 
nonbinding dispute resolution involving a neutral third party who tries to 
help the disputing parties reach a mutually agreeable solution.”14  Media-
tion can be defined broadly—as allowing for neutral evaluation of claims 
and reasonableness of settlement offers—or narrowly—as only allowing 
the neutral15 to facilitate the parties’ negotiations.16  However mediation is 
defined, each state determines the qualifications, standards, and sanctions 
applicable to mediators.17 
 
 14. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 453 (3d pocket ed. 2006). 
 15. “Neutral,” for the purposes of this Comment, is used interchangeably with “media-
tor.” 
 16. See Douglas H. Yarn, Lawyer Ethics in ADR and the Recommendations of Ethics 
2000 to Revise the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Considerations for Adoption and 
State Application, 54 ARK. L. REV. 207, 216 (2001).  Note that nonattorney–mediators will 
almost necessarily be confined to a more narrow version of mediation, while attorney–
mediators, because of their legal knowledge, may choose either style. 
 17. See ALA. CODE OF ETHICS FOR MEDIATORS II (Alabama); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 100 
(Alaska); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2238 (LexisNexis, Westlaw through 2011 3d Legis. Sess.) 
(Arizona); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-206 (Westlaw through 2011 Legis. Sess.) (Arkansas); 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1775.12 (Deering, Westlaw through 2011–2012 1st Extra. Sess.) 
(California); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307 (Westlaw through 2011 1st Reg. Sess.) (Colo-
rado); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-235d (Westlaw through 2011 Jan. Reg. Sess.) (Connecticut); 
DEL. CH. CT. R. 95 (Delaware) (mediation for “business and technology disputes”); D.C. 
CODE § 16-4207 (Westlaw through Sep. 2011) (District of Colombia); FLA. STAT. § 44.405 
(Westlaw through 2011 1st Reg. Sess.) (Florida); GA. ALT. DISP. RESOL. R. VII (Georgia); 
GUIDELINES FOR HAW. MEDIATORS V, available at 
http://www.courts.state.hi.us/services/alternative_dispute/selecting/guidelines/confidentialit
y_&_information_exchange.html (Hawaii); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-808 (Westlaw through 
2011 Chs. 1–335) (Idaho); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/8 (Westlaw through P.A. 97-342 of 
2011 Reg. Sess., with exception of P.A. 97-333 to -334) (Illinois); IND. R. OF ALT. DISP. 
RESOL. 2.5, available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/adr/#_Toc244667873 (Indiana); 
IOWA CODE § 679C.108 (Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.) (Iowa); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-
4
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Parties to mediation and their attorneys will have certain expectations 
of both the mediator and the mediation process.  They expect that the me-
diation will be conducted according to the conventions of the state, that the 
mediator will make some evaluation of the chances of success of the 
claims, and that the mediator will keep their discussions confidential.18  
Confidentiality is perhaps the most important factor in the success of medi-
ation as a form of dispute resolution.  Parties expect that what they say will 
go no further and so are more willing to admit fault or regret than they 
would be if their statements could be repeated in court.19 
 
511 to -512 (Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.) (Kansas); KY. MODEL CT. MEDIATION 12 
(Kentucky); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112 (Westlaw through 2011 1st Extra. Sess.) (Loui-
siana); ME. R. CIV. P. 16B (2009) (Maine); MD. CT. R. 17-109 (2009) (Maryland); MASS. R. 
SUP. JUD. CT. 1:18 at R. 8, available at http://www.lawlib.state.ma.us/ 
source/mass/rules/sjc/sjc118.html (Massachusetts); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 205.747 (Westlaw 
through 2011 Reg. Sess.) (Michigan); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.10 (Minnesota); MISS. 
MEDIATION R. FOR CIV. LITIG. VII, available at http://courts.ms.gov/rules/ 
msrulesofcourt/court_annexed_mediation.pdf (Mississippi); MO. SUP. CT. R. 17.06 (Mis-
souri); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-813 (Westlaw through 2011 legislation) (Montana); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 25-2937 (Westlaw through 2011 1st Reg. Sess.) (Nebraska); NEV. MEDIATION 
R. 11 (Nevada); N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 170 (New Hampshire); N.J. STAT. ANN § 2A:23C-8 
(West, Westlaw through L. 2011 c. 136) (New Jersey); N.M. STAT. ANN. §44-7B-5 
(Westlaw through 2011 1st Reg. Sess.) (New Mexico); N.Y. C.P.R.L. § 7504 (MCKINNEY 
2011) (New York); N.C. STANDARDS OF PROF’L CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS III (North Caro-
lina); N.D. R. CT. IV (North Dakota); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2710.07 (West, Westlaw 
through portion of 2011–2012 Sess.) (Ohio); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1805 (Westlaw through 
2011 1st Reg. Sess.) (Oklahoma); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.220 (Westlaw through 2011 Reg. 
Sess.) (Oregon); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5949 (Westlaw through 2011 Act 81) (Pennsylvania); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-44 (Westlaw through 2011 Jan. Sess.) (Rhode Island); S.C. ALT. 
DISP. RESOL. R. 8 (2009) (South Carolina); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13A-8 (Westlaw 
through 2011 Reg. Sess.) (South Dakota); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 31 (2009) (Tennessee); TEX. 
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.053 (West, Westlaw through 1st Called Sess. 2011) 
(Texas); UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-208 (West, Westlaw through 2011 2nd Special Sess.) 
(Utah); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §5720 (Westlaw through 2011 1st Sess.) (Vermont); VA. 
CODE ANN. §8.01-581.22 (Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.) (Virginia); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 7.07.070 (Westlaw through 2011 legislation) (Washington); W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 25.12 
(West Virginia); WIS. STAT. § 904.085 (Westlaw through 2011 Act 44, except for Acts 32 
and 37), amended by Executive Budget Act, 2011 Wis. Act 32 (updating statutory cross-
reference) (Wisconsin); WYO. STAT. ANN. §1-43-102 (Westlaw through 2011 Gen. Sess.) 
(Wyoming). 
 18. Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, “conduct or statements made in com-
promise negotiations” are inadmissible as evidence to prove “liability for, invalidity of, or 
amount of a claim . . . or to impeach through a prior inconsistent statement or contradic-
tion[.]”  FED R. EVID. 408(a). 
 19. One place where apologies have been found to be extremely useful tools in reduc-
ing litigation is in medical-malpractice suits.  A study by Johns Hopkins found that apolo-
gies reduced malpractice settlement amounts by thirty percent.  Rachel Zimmerman, Doc-
5
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B.   Attorney Ethics Rules 
While confidentiality is important, parties to mediation also expect 
that the mediator will behave according to the standards of his profession.  
If mediators are presumed to adhere to mediation ethical standards, then in 
most states, they would be expected to keep everything said and done in 
mediation confidential.20  However, if the mediator is an attorney, then the 
question becomes: is he or she expected to adhere to the attorney ethics 
standards also?21  The American Bar Association has attempted to solve 
 
tors’ New Tool to Fight Lawsuits: Saying I’m Sorry, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2004, at A1; see 
also Jeffrey M. Senger, Frequently Asked Questions About ADR, 48 U.S. ATTY’S BULLETIN 
9, 11 (2000). 
 20. “Everything” is slightly misleading.  However, it is much simpler than “everything 
except child and elder abuse, threats or actual violence, and in some states, statements cov-
ered by open meetings legislation.” 
 21. Each state also retains its own Code.  See ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 
(Alabama); ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Alaska); ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Arizona); ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Arkansas); CAL. RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-100 (California); COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Colo-
rado); CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Connecticut); DEL. RULES OF PROF’L. 
CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Delaware); D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (District of Colombia); 
FLA. BAR REG. R. 4-8.3 (Florida); GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Georgia); HAW. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Hawaii); IDAHO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3  (Ida-
ho); ILL. SUP. CT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Illinois); IND. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Indiana); IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 32:8.3 (Iowa); KAN. RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Kansas); KY. SUP. CT. R. 8.3 (Kentucky); LA. STATE BAR ASS’N. 
ART. XVI § 8.3 (Louisiana); ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Maine); MD. LAWYER’S 
RULES OF. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Maryland); MASS. R. SUP. JUD. CT. 3.07 at R. 8.3, avail-
able at http://www.lawlib.state.ma.us/source/mass/rules/sjc/sjc307/rule8-3.html (Massachu-
setts); MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Michigan); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Minnesota); MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Mississippi); MO. 
SUP. CT. R. 4-8.3 (Missouri); MONT RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Montana); NEB. CT. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 3-508.3 (Nebraska); NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 
(Nevada); N.H. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (New Hampshire); N.J. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 8.3 (New Jersey); N.M. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 16-803 (New Mexico); 
N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (New York); N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 
(North Carolina); N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (North Dakota); OHIO RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Ohio); 5 OKLA. STATE CH. 1, APP. 3-A R. 8.3 (Oklahoma); OR. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Oregon); PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Penn-
sylvania); R.I. SUP. CT V at R. 8.3 (Rhode Island); S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 
(South Carolina); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-18-APPX-8.3 (Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.) 
(South Dakota); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 8 at R. 8.3 (Tennessee); TEX. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
8.03 (Texas); UTAH RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Utah); VT. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Vermont); VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, para. 8.3 (Virginia); WASH. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (Washington); W. Va. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (West 
Virginia); WIS. SUP. CT. R 20:8.3 (Wisconsin); WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 
(Wyoming). 
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this issue by providing, in the words of one author, “an ‘exit door’ from the 
lawyers’ ethical rules. The ‘key’ to this ‘door’ is advising the ADR dispu-
tants that the lawyer/neutral is not acting as an attorney for any or all of the 
disputants with the attendant attorney-client ethical rules, but is instead act-
ing as a neutral.”22  To be sure, this so-called exit door may not be perfect 
because the lawyer qua neutral may still be subject to some other provi-
sions of the Model Rules.   
While this exit strategy sounds great in theory, it works only when all 
parties to the mediation behave according to the highest ethical standards.  
In cases such as the hypothetical described supra, where a party actively 
tries to defraud the other party, the attorney–mediator’s “exit” begins to 
look like complicity.  Attorney–mediators are, if not formally then at least 
perceptually, bound by both the mediator ethics rules and the Code. 
As one might expect, there is very little case law in this area.  The 
American Bar Association did not adopt a modern version of Rule 8.3 until 
1969, and the first major case involving the Rule was not until 1988.23  
That first major case was In re Himmel.24  Himmel, a solo practitioner,25 
was suspended from practicing law for a year by the Illinois Supreme Court 
because he failed to report the misconduct of another attorney.26  Himmel 
came as a “dramatic surprise to the bar.”27  To that point, Professor Rotun-
da notes: 
[w]hile there [were] lawyers who [took] seriously their ethical obligations 
to report the violations of other lawyers, it [was] unusual to find the bar au-
thorities enforcing this rule. . . . [Until Himmel, it was] virtually unheard of 
to find a case where a lawyer [was] disciplined merely for refusing to re-
port another lawyer.28 
 
 22. Duane W. Krohnke, ADR Ethics Rules to Be Added to Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 18 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 108, 115 (2000). 
 23. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's Unethical Vio-
lations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 977, 979–80 (1988).  Rotunda notes 
that the Rules contained a “vague” provision for whistleblowing in their original form, writ-
ten in 1908.  Id.  The Rules were significantly amended in the 1980s; however, Rule 8.3 was 
in place in the 1969 revisions.  Id. at 980. 
 24. In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988).  The actual details of Himmel, while fas-
cinating, are not as relevant here as the fact that the case happened at all. 
 25. Rotunda, supra note 23, at 982. 
 26. Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 796.  The attorney whose misconduct led to the charges 
against Himmel was disbarred.  Id. at 790. 
 27. Rotunda, supra note 23, at 991.  The case was described to the author by a member 
of the North Carolina Dispute Resolution Commission as the seed that grew into the recent 
changes in the North Carolina Code. 
 28. Id. at 982. 
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The dearth of case law noted by Professor Rotunda has not changed.  One 
case that is frequently cited in discussions of mediation confidentiality is In 
re Waller.29  Waller represented the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case 
that was sent to mediation.30  As there was no mediation confidentiality 
statute in D.C. at the time, the trial court made an order regarding the medi-
ation.31  The order indicated that “no statements of any party or counsel 
shall be disclosed to the court or admissible as evidence for any purpose at 
the trial of this case.”32  The mediator realized that the surgeon who operat-
ed on the plaintiff was not named as a defendant, and asked Waller why 
not.33  Waller told the mediator that he had not named the surgeon because 
he “was the surgeon’s attorney.”34  The mediator encouraged Waller to tell 
the trial court about this, and when he did not, the mediator himself did 
so.35  Waller made some excuses,36 but was eventually disciplined by the 
D.C. Board of Professional Responsibility, an action confirmed by the D.C. 
Court of Appeals.37 
The mediator, whose actions were technically in contempt of the court 
order, was not disciplined.  Professor Irvine cautions that in the Waller 
case, “the attorney–mediator made a judgment call that was supported by 
the court.  Not every attorney–mediator should expect to be so fortunate.”38  
That mediators are rarely the subject of such disciplinary actions has sever-
al causes.  Firstly, if we use the Smith hypothetical above as our example, 
the actual infraction was not committed by Smith—his liability is second-
ary and mainly to the profession, rather than to the wife.  Secondly, there is 
usually a hold harmless clause in any mediation contract, so that the 
wronged party is contractually bound to overlook any primary liability of 
the mediator.  A more persuasive reason is that the goal of mediation is a 
confidential settlement—parties are therefore reluctant to air their dirty 
 
 29. In re Waller, 573 A.2d 780 (D.C. 1990). 
 30. Id. at 781. 
 31. Mori Irvine, Serving Two Masters: The Obligation under the Rules of Professional 
Conduct to Report Attorney Misconduct in a Confidential Mediation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 155, 
179 (1994). 
 32. Waller, 573 A.2d at 781 n.4. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 782 (“What really happened is that I said I represented Dr. Jackson [the sur-
geon] but I really meant that I didn’t represent Dr. Jackson.  Dr. Jackson wasn’t a party so I 
didn’t think it was important.”). 
 37. Id. at 780 (“suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for a 
period of sixty days”). 
 38. Irvine, supra note 31, at 180. 
8
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss1/7
MATTHEWS.DOCX 1/9/12  12:01 PM 
2011] CONFIDENTIALITY AND DUTY TO REPORT 213 
laundry in the courts where everything is public record.  Infractions of the 
Code or the mediation ethics rules by an attorney–mediator are not often 
adjudicated by the courts, but rather by ethics committees that publish deci-
sions only when they would be helpful to future attorneys or mediators.  A 
final reason is that some courts believe that the clash between the two sets 
of rules is a question for the legislature.39 
Because the courts have been unhelpful in this area, attorneys and dis-
pute resolution professionals have turned to the rules that govern attorneys 
and mediators in order to bring some order and guidance to the situation. 
III. THREE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM 
The current Model Rules do not recognize the role of neutral for lawyers, 
and the prevailing paradigm of lawyering under the Model Rules is the 
lawyer functioning as a representative of a client. Arguably, the legal and 
ADR professional regimes are distinct, and lawyers acting as neutrals 
should be governed by ADR professional standards like any non-lawyer 
acting as a neutral. An analogous distinction is between lawyers and law-
yers acting as judges, wherein the former are subject to the Model Rules 
and the latter are subject to the Judicial Code of Conduct.40 
While some commentators may claim that the two standards are not in ten-
sion,41 they are, and in fact cause problems in certain, easily repeatable sit-
uations. 
In order to get an idea as to how the states have approached the con-
flict between mediation confidentiality and reporting requirements, this 
Comment looked at the Code and the mediation rules for each state and the 
District of Colombia.42  The states fall into three basic categories:  (1) those 
 
 39. See, e.g., Foxgate Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1128 
(Cal. 2001) (“Whether a mediator in addition to participants should be allowed to report 
conduct during mediation that the mediator believes is taken in bad faith and therefore might 
be sanctionable under [the] Code of Civil Procedure [or the Code] . . . is a policy question to 
be resolved by the Legislature.”). 
 40. Yarn, supra note 16, at 220. 
 41. See id. at 216 (stating that the two standards “neither overlap nor conflict signifi-
cantly”).  Also note that the ADR rules generally provide for reporting of any matter “re-
quired by law or rule.”  Several mediators have commented to the Author that they are not 
willing to risk their professional reputations and mediation certifications on such vague lan-
guage, especially since the Codes have not been enacted by the legislature. 
 42. In the analysis that follows, three states are not included: California, Michigan, and 
New York.  The California Ethics Rules have no provision analogous to Rule 8.3.  See CAL. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-100 to 5-320.  If there were an equivalent provision, Cali-
fornia would fall into the second category of states, those where mediators are allowed to 
testify.  See CAL. EVID. CODE § 703.5 (2011) (“[N]o arbitrator or mediator, shall be compe-
9
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with direct tension between the mediation confidentiality requirements and 
the Code’s reporting requirements under Rule 8.3,43 (2) those with an “out” 
for the mediator if the misconduct has already been reported, and (3) those 
that have made an attempt to harmonize the two.  A breakdown of the 
states by category is represented below. 
 
States in black are those with harmonious rules.  States in gray have rules 
that allow mediators to talk about misconduct, but not to report it.  States in 
white have clashing rules. 
A.  Wishin’ and Hopin’ 
Thirty-six states and the District of Colombia have mediation rules 
that clash with their Code of Professional Responsibility.44  This means that 
 
tent to testify . . . except as to a statement or conduct that could . . . be the subject of investi-
gation by the State Bar or Commission on Judicial Performance . . . .”).  What Michigan 
calls “mediation” is actually more like arbitration, with a panel of “mediators” and formal 
presentations of evidence by the parties.  See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.4691 (2009).  New 
York has no centrally-codified mediator ethics rules. 
 43. Or the equivalent. 
 44. This Comment considers only state rules, not all the rules for mediation in federal 
courts.  In a few cases, the federal rules fall into a different category from the state rules.  
Compare GUIDELINES FOR HAWAI’I MEDIATORS § V.1. (2002) (“The mediator . . . should 
hold all information acquired in mediation in confidence.  Mediators are obliged to resist 
disclosure of information about the contents and outcomes of the mediation process.”), 
available at http://www.courts.state.hi.us/services/alternative_dispute/ 
10
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in over seventy percent of jurisdictions, the highest court has adopted two 
sets of rules that are in direct conflict.  An example of the clashing rules is 
provided by the District of Colombia.  Pursuant to the D.C. Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct, “[a] lawyer who knows that another lawyer has commit-
ted a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial 
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer 
in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.”45  
The operative words in this rule, of course, are “knows” and “shall.”  If the 
hypothetical involving Mediator Smith was in D.C. and he knew that the 
husband’s lawyer was perpetrating a fraud, he would be required to report 
said behavior to the State Bar.  However, pursuant to section 16-4207 of 
the D.C. Code, “[u]nless subject to [open meetings requirements], media-
tion communications are confidential to the extent agreed by the parties or 
provided by other law or rule of the District of Columbia.”46  Mediators are 
trained to report child or elder abuse, threats of violence, or actual vio-
lence,47 but they are extremely hesitant to make a call where the issue is 
professional malpractice.  Many interpret the conflicting rules as requiring 
them only to confirm whether a mediation session did or did not take place 
and whether a settlement was reached. 
There are a couple of explanations as to why so many states have 
clashing rules.  Firstly, mediation is relatively new, and the rules are gener-
ally on their first or second iteration—all the kinks have not been noticed or 
ironed out.  Secondly, attorneys generally abide by their Codes—it is rare 
that a mediator would have cause to report an attorney because of some-
thing that attorney did in a mediation session.48  Also, as noted above, the 
liability of the mediator is usually secondary to that of the attorney in-
volved.  Any aggrieved party would need to take a lot of time and energy to 
bring charges under the Code against the mediator—time and energy that 
probably would be better spent pursuing the other party or his attorney. 
 
selecting/guidelines/introduction.html, with D. HAW. LOCAL R. 88.1(k) (2009) (allowing 
mediators to break confidentiality “to provide evidence in an attorney disciplinary proceed-
ing”). 
 45. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (emphasis added). 
 46. D.C. CODE § 16-4207 (Westlaw through Sep. 2011). 
 47. These reporting requirements are explicitly required in some states and implicitly 
required in others.  Compare, ME. R. CIV. P. 16B(k)(ii) (“A neutral does not breach confi-
dentiality by making such a disclosure if the disclosure is . . . information concerning the 
abuse or neglect of any protected person.”), with MASS. R. SUP. JUD. CT. 1:18 at R. 9(h)(i) 
(“[I]nformation disclosed in dispute resolution proceedings . . . shall be kept confidential by 
the neutral . . . unless disclosure is required by law or court rule.”). 
 48. A cynic might note that this is because attorneys are smart enough to keep their 
misdeeds hidden and their clients quiet enough that a mediator would never notice the mis-
conduct. 
11
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B.  The Ability to Testify Only 
Five states (Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wis-
consin) have mediation rules that allow the mediators some kind of “out” 
when allegations of misconduct are made.49  These states do not allow the 
mediator to report misconduct, but will allow him or her to either testify or 
to disclose information that may be relevant after an accusation of miscon-
duct is made or proven.50 
In New Mexico, the mediator can be compelled to testify in cases 
where his or her testimony is needed to “disprove a claim or complaint of 
professional misconduct or malpractice based on conduct during a media-
tion and filed against a mediation party or nonparty participant.”51  There is 
no provision for reporting misconduct by the mediator.52  Virginia’s rule is 
substantially the same.53 
The rules in Maryland, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin are vaguer.  Pur-
suant to section 904.085 of Wisconsin’s General Statutes,  
[i]n an action or proceeding distinct from the dispute whose settlement is at-
 
 49. Each has a Rule 8.3 that requires attorneys with knowledge of misconduct to report 
it.  MD. LAWYER’S RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (“A lawyer who knows that another 
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a question 
as to the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall in-
form the appropriate authority.”); N.M. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 16-803(a) (“A lawyer 
who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct that raises a question as to the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer 
in other respects, shall inform the appropriate authority.”); PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 8.3(a) (“A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct that raises a question as to the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or 
fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate authority.”); VA. SUP. CT. 
R. pt. 6, §. II, para. 8.3 (“A lawyer having reliable information that another lawyer has 
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question 
as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law shall inform the appro-
priate authority.”); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:8.3 (“A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has 
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question 
as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall in-
form the appropriate professional authority.”). 
 50. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5949(b)(3) (Westlaw through 2011 Act 81) (“[Duty 
of confidentiality] does not apply to a fraudulent communication during mediation that is 
relevant evidence in an action to enforce or set aside a mediated agreement reached as a re-
sult of that fraudulent communication.”). 
 51. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7B-5(A)(8) (Westlaw through 2011 1st Reg. Sess.). 
 52. See id. 
 53. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22 (Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.) (detailing that 
confidentiality may be waived “where communications are sought or offered to prove or 
disprove a claim or complaint of misconduct or malpractice filed against a party’s legal rep-
resentative based on conduct occurring during a mediation”). 
12
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tempted through mediation, the court may admit evidence otherwise barred 
by this section if, after an in camera hearing, it determines that admission is 
necessary to prevent a manifest injustice of sufficient magnitude to out-
weigh the importance of protecting the principle of confidentiality in medi-
ation proceedings generally.54 
Wisconsin attorney–mediators, therefore, cannot report misconduct that 
they become privy to via mediation.  However, if there is an accusation in a 
hearing distinct from the dispute that led to the mediation—e.g., a griev-
ance hearing or a hearing to set aside the settlement—and the court decides 
that the mediator’s testimony would be in the interests of justice, then the 
mediator may be ordered to testify.  The rules in Maryland and Pennsylva-
nia are, though not as detailed, substantially the same.55 
While the five states discussed here have rules that acknowledge that 
things occasionally go wrong in mediation and that parties do not always 
bargain in good faith, no state recognizes the requirement of reporting in its 
own version of Rule 8.3.56  If there is a hearing and the mediator is called to 
testify, it may become obvious that the mediator has not reported miscon-
duct that he had knowledge of, opening the mediator to professional sanc-
tions. 
It is worth noting that the Uniform Mediation Act states that where 
there has been “a claim or complaint of professional misconduct or mal-
practice filed against a mediation party, nonparty participant, or representa-
tive of a party based on conduct occurring during a mediation[,]” the strict 
confidentiality requirements are relaxed.57  However, they are only relaxed 
for the parties involved and their attorneys, for the Act goes on to state that 
“[a] mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation 
communication” in order to substantiate such a claim.58 
C.  A Clear Harmonization 
 
 54. WIS. STAT. § 904.085(4)(e) (Westlaw through 2011 Act 44, except for Acts 32 and 
37) (emphasis added), amended by Executive Budget Act, 2011 Wis. Act 32 (updating statu-
tory cross-reference). 
 55. MD. R. OF ALT. DISP. RESOL. 17-109(d)(3) (indicating confidentiality may be 
waived to “assert or defend against a claim or defense that because of fraud, duress, or mis-
representation a contract arising out of a mediation should be rescinded.”); 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 5949(b)(3) (Westlaw through 2011 Act 81) (“The privilege and limitation [to confi-
dentiality] does not apply to a fraudulent communication during mediation that is relevant 
evidence in an action to enforce or set aside a mediated agreement reached as a result of that 
fraudulent communication.”). 
 56. See supra, notes 17, 21 and accompanying text. 
 57. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(a)(6) (2001). 
 58. Id. § 6(c). 
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Six states (Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennes-
see, and Washington) have harmonious mediation and ethics rules.59  These 
states are concentrated geographically in the southeast, which is an unex-
pected but explainable result.  If states are a laboratory for experimenta-
tion,60 then it stands to reason that nearby states will copy a state that has 
sensible and logical rules.  The six states fall into two categories: those that 
use the mediation rules as the (to borrow a metaphor) exit door61 and those 
that use the Code as the exit.62  The same number of states fall into the 
former category (Florida, South Carolina, and Tennessee) as the latter, but 
North Carolina, as discussed below, is the latest state to harmonize its rules, 
and it chose to amend the Code.63  It remains to be seen whether more 
states will follow the lead of these six states and which approach they will 
choose. 
 1.  Reporting Permitted by Mediation Rules 
Florida, South Carolina, and Tennessee all make provision in their 
mediation ethics rules for reporting of professional malpractice as required 
by the respective state Codes.64  The malpractice must be professional to be 
 
 59. Compare FLA. BAR REG. R. 4-8.3, and  GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3, and 
N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3, and S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3, and 
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 8 at R. 8.3, and WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3, with FLA. 
STAT. § 44.405 (Westlaw through 2011 1st Reg. Sess.), and GA. ALT. DISP. RESOL. R. VII, 
and N.C. STANDARDS OF PROF’L CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS R. III, and S.C. ALT. DISP. 
RESOL. R. 8, and WASH. REV. CODE. § 7.07.070 (Westlaw through 2011 legislation). 
 60. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 61. See FLA. STAT. § 44.405 (“[T]here is no confidentiality or privilege attached to . . . 
any mediation communication . . . [o]ffered to report, prove, or disprove professional mal-
practice occurring during the mediation, solely for the purpose of the professional malprac-
tice proceeding.”); S.C. APP. CT. R. 407 (“This rule [guaranteeing mediation confidentiality] 
does not prohibit . . . [a]ny disclosures required by law or a professional code of ethics.”); 
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 31 (“Nothing herein shall replace, eliminate, or render inapplicable rele-
vant ethical standards.”). 
 62. See GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 8.3 (“There is no disciplinary penalty for a 
violation of this Rule.”); N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(e) (“A lawyer who is serv-
ing as a mediator and who is subject to the North Carolina Supreme Court Standards of Pro-
fessional Conduct for Mediators . . . is not required to disclose information learned during a 
mediation if the Standards do not allow disclosure. If disclosure is allowed by the Standards, 
the lawyer is required to report professional misconduct consistent with the duty to report.”); 
WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (“(a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer 
has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct . . . should inform the ap-
propriate professional authority.” (emphasis added)). 
 63. N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(e). 
 64. See supra note 61. 
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reportable—simple bad behavior or bad faith is not enough.65  Pursuant to 
the Florida mediation rules, “there is no confidentiality or privilege at-
tached to . . . any mediation communication . . . [o]ffered to report, prove, 
or disprove professional malpractice . . . [or] professional misconduct oc-
curring during the mediation, solely for the internal use of the body con-
ducting the investigation of the conduct.”66  Pursuant to the South Carolina 
rules, one of the limited exceptions to confidentiality is “[a]ny disclosure[] 
required by law or a professional code of ethics.”67  Pursuant to the Tennes-
see mediation rules, “[a] Neutral shall preserve and maintain the confiden-
tiality of all dispute resolution proceedings except where required by law to 
disclose information.”68  However, “[n]othing herein shall replace, elimi-
nate, or render inapplicable relevant ethical standards not in conflict with 
these rules which may be imposed by the Code of Responsibility with re-
spect to lawyers, or similar sets of standards imposed upon any Neutral by 
virtue of the Neutral’s professional calling.”69 
Each of the three states, then, permits the disclosures required by the 
mediator’s professional Code.70  The flaw in the design is clear.  Some me-
diators will be bound by professional codes, and some will not.  This will 
have two distinct impacts on mediations.  Firstly, the mediator who is 
bound by the code will be forced to keep an eye out for infractions that he 
is bound to report—Smith, in the hypothetical above, would have had to 
report (under the attorney Code of ethics) what the husband’s lawyer was 
doing.  Secondly, parties to the mediation will (or should) be aware that 
their actions will be subject to an extra layer of scrutiny by the mediator.   
If the mediator is required to abide by the reporting requirements of 
his professional Code, then he cannot give his full attention to the media-
tion; he must necessarily give some of his attention to possible reportable 
infractions.  A nonattorney–mediator, when confronted with a situation like 
the one described above, would work to encourage disclosure, urge the 
husband to recognize the problem with failing to disclose the asset, and the 
discuss issues with negotiating in bad faith.  In other words, the nonattor-
ney–mediator would be focused on the mediation and on getting both par-
ties to a successful and fair resolution.  An attorney–mediator, on the other 
hand, would be focused on the mediation, but a small voice in the back of 
his or her head would be calculating the risks and rewards of reporting the 
 
 65. See supra note 61. 
 66. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a)(4), (4)(a)(6). 
 67. S.C. ALT. DISP. RESOL. R. 8(b)(5). 
 68. TENN. SUP. CT. R. 31, at app. A § 7(a). 
 69. Id. § 2(b). 
 70. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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conduct of the husband’s lawyer.  If the attorney–mediator reports the law-
yer and the complaint is without foundation, the mediator has broken con-
fidentiality as a mediator and will be subject to sanctions by the board that 
oversees mediators.71 
Reporting—even if the report is substantiated—will give the mediator 
a reputation in the community as a reporter.  This reputation should not 
scare attorneys who negotiate in good faith and ethically, but may well 
cause a drop in the reporter’s mediation business because attorneys may 
worry that the mediator will report first and think later.72  Even if parties 
continue to use the mediator, there is a chance that they will be less forth-
coming than they would be with a nonattorney–mediator or with an attor-
ney–mediator who has no history of reporting, out of concern that their le-
gitimate actions could be misconstrued and lead to an investigation by the 
state bar. 
The solution to Smith’s dilemma used by Florida, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee is, therefore, not without complication.  While the method used 
by these states is infinitely preferable to simply ignoring the problem, it has 
flaws that may negatively impact the mediation process. 
 2.  Harmonization Through the Ethics Code 
Three states with harmonious rules (Georgia, North Carolina, and 
Washington) use their Codes to provide the harmony.  The differences be-
tween the three are interesting and instructive.  Georgia’s mediation rules 
are substantially the same as those in the states with clashing rules—
mediators are required to report child abuse and may break confidentiality 
to defend against claims of mediator misconduct.  However, Georgia has 
no provision for testimony where misconduct has already been reported (as 
in the states like Maryland with some kind of exit for testimony) and no 
harmonization as in Florida, South Carolina, or Tennessee.73  In Georgia, 
the exit is in the Code: “[a] lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer 
has committed a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct 
that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthi-
ness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, should inform the appropriate 
professional authority.”74  The rule continues: “[t]here is no disciplinary 
penalty for a violation of this Rule.”75  In every other state with an equiva-
 
 71. See Irvine, supra note 31, at 180. 
 72. Mediation is, after all, a place where lying is accepted—the dance of negotiation 
requires that both sides conceal their bottom line, at least in the beginning. 
 73. See discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
 74. GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (emphasis added). 
 75. Id. 
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lent to Rule 8.3, the lawyer who knows of the misconduct is required to in-
form the appropriate authority.76  The Georgia Code was amended in 2001 
to its current form.  Before 2001, the pertinent rule read: 
(A) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of [misconduct] shall re-
port such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investi-
gate or act upon such violation. 
(B) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge or evidence concerning 
another lawyer or a judge shall reveal fully such knowledge or evidence 
upon proper request of a tribunal or other authority empowered to investi-
gate or act upon the conduct of lawyers or judges.77 
The mediation rules were enacted in 1993 and require complete confidenti-
ality except in four situations: (1) confirming appearance (or not) at a 
scheduled mediation, (2) reporting child abuse or threats, (3) documents or 
communications needed to prove or disprove misconduct on the part of the 
mediator, and (4) statutory duties.78  The rules have been amended but not 
substantially altered since their enactment.79  Perhaps concluding that the 
 
 76. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (“A lawyer possessing unprivi-
leged knowledge of a violation of Rule 8.4 shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or oth-
er authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation.” (emphasis added)); IND. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (“A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has commit-
ted a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to 
that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform 
the appropriate professional authority.” (emphasis added)). 
  Interestingly, the official comment to the Georgia Rule reads: “Self-regulation of 
the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investiga-
tions when they know of a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct[,]” even 
though the language of the rule makes it clear that reporting is not required.  GA. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 1 (emphasis added). 
 77. GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT DR 1-103 (repealed 2001), available at 
http://www.gabar.org/handbook/part_iii_before_january_1_2001_-_canons_of_ethics/ 
_rule_3-101/. 
 78. GA. ALT. DISP. RESOL. VII.  In many states, “statutory duties” refer to open meeting 
requirements.  See 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/8 (Westlaw through P.A. 97-342 of 2011 Reg. 
Sess., with exception of P.A. 97-333 to -334) (“Unless subject to the Open Meetings Act or 
the Freedom of Information Act, mediation communications are confidential to the extent 
agreed by the parties or provided by other law or rule of this State.”). 
 79. There have been multiple amendments: removing protections of confidentiality 
where there have been threats or reports of child abuse (February 1995); making intake ses-
sions confidential (November 1996); making notes and records of a court ADR program 
immune from discovery to the extent that such notes or records pertain to cases and parties 
ordered or referred by a court to the program (November 1996); removing confidentiality 
where there has been a complaint against the mediator (November 1996); and limiting dis-
covery to written and executed agreements only (May 1999). See GA. ALT. DISP. RESOL. 
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rules were intentionally harmonized with the Code is a charitable interpre-
tation, but it does explain why Georgia’s Code is different from that in al-
most every other state. 
Washington State adopted new ethics rules in 2006.80  The state bar 
debated modifying Washington’s permissive reporting requirement to make 
Rule 8.3 reporting mandatory.81  The committee charged with determining 
whether to amend the rule (the WSBA Ethics 2003 Committee) debated for 
over two months whether to require mandatory reporting under Rule 8.3, 
and eventually decided against such a move.82  The debate over whether to 
move to mandatory reporting is fascinating, but nowhere in the minutes of 
the meetings is mediation mentioned.83 
North Carolina has recently amended its Code in order to exempt at-
torney–mediators from the reporting requirements imposed by Rule 8.3.84  
Pursuant to North Carolina’s new Rule 8.3, 
[a] lawyer who is serving as a mediator and who is subject to the North 
Carolina Supreme Court Standards of Professional Conduct for Mediators 
(the Standards) is not required to disclose information learned during a me-
diation if the Standards do not allow disclosure.  If disclosure is allowed by 
the Standards, the lawyer is required to report professional misconduct con-
sistent with the duty to report . . . .85  
In North Carolina, attorney–mediators are mediators first and attorneys se-
cond.  North Carolina is the only state in the union to have rules that are 
written in this manner.86  The amendment to Rule 8.3 was recommended by 
the Standards, Discipline and Advisory Opinions Committee of the Dispute 
Resolution Commission.87  The Commission had been asked by the State 
Bar to examine the conflict between the Code and the mediation rules, and, 
after “wrestl[ing] with the Rule 8.3 scenario as well as with the larger issue 
of what happens when a mediator’s ethical obligations conflict with the 
standards of conduct of another profession to which he or she belongs,” the 
Commission decided to recommend amending the Rule to make the media-
 
VII, available at http://www.godr.org/files/CURRENT%20ADR%20-
RULES%20COMPLETE%201-19-2010.pdf. 
 80. Ethics 2003 Committee, WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.wsba.org/Resources-and-Services/Ethics/Ethics-2003 (last visited Oct. 23, 
2011). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(e). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See supra, notes 17, 21 and accompanying text. 
 87. 2009–2010 N.C. DISPUTE RESOL. COMM’N REP. 5 (2010). 
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tion rules dominant.88 
The difficulty with using the Code to ease the tension between the 
mediation ethics and the Code is that the Code only applies to attorneys.  
Attorneys, therefore, will know that they should keep misconduct of other 
attorneys, revealed in mediation, confidential.  Nonattorney–mediators 
may, however, be bound by a Code applicable to their own profession—for 
example, the mediator may be a Doctor of Medicine (MD).  Nonattorney–
mediators may see misconduct like that described above, know that it is 
ethically bad, but not know to whom they should report the misconduct.  
The body that oversees mediation ethics would advise nondisclosure.89  If 
the misconduct is especially egregious, it is easy to imagine that a mediator 
frustrated by this answer would look around for someone to whom he or 
she could to report the attorney’s conduct. 
IV.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
There are four issues that are important to consider when examining 
the tensions that have been identified here.  These are (1) whose interests 
would (and would not) be served by reporting attorney misconduct; (2) 
whether confidentiality can ever be absolutely guaranteed; (3) whether 
keeping misconduct confidential is within the reasonable expectations of 
the parties to the mediation; [and] (4) whether it is possible to provide clear 
guidance for all parties involved.90 
A.  Whose Interest Are Best Served by the Confidentiality Rules? 
Public confidence in lawyers and the legal profession is undermined 
when stories of misconduct come to light.  This is doubly so if the miscon-
duct was ignored by other lawyers.  In ruling on Himmel, the Illinois Su-
preme Court held that the “underlying purposes” of the disciplinary rules 
were to “maintain the integrity of the legal profession, to protect the admin-
istration of justice from reproach, and to safeguard the public.”91  Each of 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. See N.C. DISPUTE RESOL. COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. 10-16 (2010), available at 
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/DRC/Documents/compliedaor_10-16.pdf. 
 90. The four have their genesis in the minority report from a committee of the N.C. 
Dispute Resolution Commission.  See N.C. DISP. RESOL. COMM’N. STANDARDS AND 
DISCIPLINE COMM., MINORITY REPORT TO THE NORTH CAROLINA DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
COMMISSION 2–4 (November 3, 2006) (on file with the Campbell Law Review) [hereinafter 
Minority Report]. 
 91. In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 795 (Ill. 1988) (quoting In re LaPinska, 381 N.E.2d 
700, 705 (Ill. 1978)). 
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the three purposes identified in Himmel is impaired when attorneys fail to 
abide by the requirements of Rule 8.3.  Notwithstanding the damage exter-
nal to the mediation, the confidence of parties to the mediation in the fair-
ness of the settlement would be undermined if one party learned of mis-
conduct serious enough to have been subject to reporting requirements that 
was not reported.   
If stories of misconduct come to light, they also erode the confidence 
of the parties to mediation.  No matter if one’s mediation was conducted 
according to the highest ethical standards and the resultant settlement was 
fair to all parties, if one of the parties hears about some misconduct that oc-
curred in his mediation, he is going to reexamine his settlement.  If the 
misconduct becomes known before the mediation is scheduled, both parties 
may be on the defensive from the start, expecting that the other party may 
be acting unethically and that the mediator is acting as an accomplice. 
B.  Are Guarantees of Confidentiality Disingenuous? 
Very few states have mediation rules that demand absolute confidenti-
ality.92  In most of the other states, there are four common exceptions that 
either require or allow mediators to disclose information they learned in the 
mediation: (1) child or elder abuse;93 (2) threats to people or property;94 (3) 
to defend against allegations of mediator misconduct,95 and (4) to train or 
consult with other mediators.96  In three states (Mississippi, Louisiana, and 
Arkansas) a court may examine the mediator’s testimony in camera in or-
der to make a determination as to whether “the facts, circumstances and 
context of the communications or materials sought to be disclosed warrant 
 
 92. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 95(b) (Delaware); IND. R. OF ALT. DISP. RESOL. 2.11 (Indiana); 
N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 170(E)(1) (New Hampshire); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-44 (Westlaw 
through 2011 Jan. Sess.) (Rhode Island); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 154.053(c) 
(Westlaw through 2011 1st Called Sess.) (Texas). 
 93. See, e.g., ME. R. CIV. P. 16B(k) (“[I]nformation concerning the abuse or neglect of 
any protected person” is not confidential). 
 94. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 36.220(6) (“A mediation communication is not confi-
dential if the mediator or a party to the mediation reasonably believes that disclosing the 
communication is necessary to prevent a party from committing a crime that is likely to re-
sult in death or substantial bodily injury to a specific person.”). 
 95. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12. § 1805(f) (“If a party who has participated in media-
tion brings an action for damages against a mediator arising out of mediation . . . [confiden-
tiality] shall be deemed to be waived as to the party bringing the action.”). 
 96. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-208(5) (Westlaw through 2011 2nd Special 
Sess.) (“An ADR provider or an ADR organization may communicate information about an 
ADR proceeding with the director for the purposes of training, program management, or 
program evaluation and when consulting with a peer. In making those communications, the 
ADR provider or ADR organization shall render anonymous all identifying information.”). 
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a protective order of the court or whether the communications or materials 
are subject to disclosure.”97 
Are absolute guarantees of confidentiality, especially in court-ordered 
mediation, a good idea?  Would they simply mean that parties have an in-
centive to hide assets or material facts?  With lowered guarantees of confi-
dentiality, the parties and their attorneys know where the line is and what 
behavior will put them over that line, making the chances of a fair and hon-
est negotiation that much higher. 
C.  What Are the Reasonable Expectations of Parties to a Mediation? 
It is unlikely that a person can become an attorney without having 
some working knowledge of the Code in his or her state.98  As a member of 
North Carolina’s Dispute Resolution Commission Standards and Discipline 
Committee put it, “[t]he unethical attorney should have no reasonable ex-
pectation that an attorney–mediator will keep his professional misconduct 
in confidence.”99  Attorneys know that professional misconduct will be re-
ported by other attorneys with knowledge.100  Attorneys who know about 
misconduct value their law license too highly not to report such behavior. 
It is harder to argue that parties to mediation will reasonably expect 
that misconduct will be kept confidential.  If a lawyer tells his client that 
there is a way to hide assets and that he or she will not tell the mediator 
about those assets, the client would reasonably assume that the lawyer has a 
legal, ethical way to hide the assets. 
D.  Can We Provide Clear Guidance? 
The need for a firm, simple, clear rule is obvious.  As things stand in 
the overwhelming majority of states, attorney–mediators must make very 
tough choices when confronted with clear misconduct.  They know that 
state Bar Associations are willing and able to sanction attorneys who do not 
report misconduct, that mediation ethics bodies zealously guard the integri-
 
 97. MISS. MEDIATION R. CIV. LIT. § VII(D); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:4112 
(Westlaw through 1st Extra. Sess.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-206 (Westlaw through 2011 
Reg. Sess.).  These states are not included in the “partly harmonious” category because there 
is nothing in those rules about misconduct—the in camera review is limited to issues con-
cerning the underlying case. 
 98.  Law schools typically require law students to take a course in Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility and all but four states require would-be attorneys to pass the Multistate 
Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE).  NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR 
EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mpre/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2011). 
 99. See Minority Report, supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 100. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3. 
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ty of the process, and that those bodies are willing to suspend the attorney–
mediator if he or she breaches their rules.  They also know that nonattor-
ney–mediators do not face the same high-stakes choices that they do.  
While there is pressure on attorney mediators to decide which side their 
bread is buttered on,101 there is also increasing demand for attorney–
mediators.102  After all, an attorney–mediator knows the lay of the land, so 
to speak, and can give the parties informed guidance on chances of litiga-
tion success or failure. 
Clear guidance will help all of the parties prepare for the mediation.  
The parties will know what they should disclose and that the other side will 
be held to the same standard; the attorneys will know the consequences of 
unethical behavior, and the mediator will have no discretion about report-
ing misconduct.   
E.  The Way Forward 
So where does this leave us?  We need a way to harmonize the Code 
and the mediation rules that takes into account the interests of both the par-
ties and the wider community, that recognizes that confidentiality is not 
always absolute, that conforms to the reasonable expectations of all in-
volved, and that is clear and simple to apply.  This Comment argues that 
the best rule is that used by Tennessee.  Pursuant to the Tennessee media-
tion rules: “[a] Neutral shall preserve and maintain the confidentiality of all 
dispute resolution proceedings except where required by law to disclose in-
formation.”103  However, the general standards of the mediation rules pro-
vide that: “[n]othing herein shall replace, eliminate, or render inapplicable 
relevant ethical standards not in conflict with these rules which may be im-
posed by the Code of Responsibility with respect to lawyers, or similar sets 
of standards imposed upon any Neutral by virtue of the Neutral’s profes-
sional calling.”104 
These rules allow the attorney–mediator to be bound by both sets of 
rules at the same time.105  As noted supra, there is the problem that nonat-
 
 101. That is, whether they would rather lose their law license or their mediation certifica-
tion. 
 102. See Urska Velikonja, Making Peace and Making Money; Economic Analysis of the 
Market for Mediators in Private Practice, 72 ALB. L. REV. 257, 263 (2009) (arguing that 
there is “attorney domination of the mediator selection process” because “most of the pri-
vate mediators' caseload is disputes already in litigation or about to be litigated.”). 
 103. TENN. SUP. CT. R. 31 at app. A § 7(a). 
 104. Id. § 2(b). 
 105. The problem with this whole system, of course, is that nonattorney–mediators are 
not bound by the Code as attorney mediators are, raising the inference that there are two 
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torney–mediators will not be beholden to the Code, but they are not bound 
by it in any other situation, so it is unfair to complain that they are not 
bound in this situation.  This rule allows the attorney–mediator to create a 
mediation that is fair to all involved and to report misconduct when neces-
sary.  The rule also formalizes the expectations of all parties that a mediator 
who is also an attorney will not completely shed that persona when he acts 
as a neutral.  It is also clear; the rule itself says that confidentiality is not 
absolute where it conflicts with the professional code of the mediator. 
This rule does, however, require the mediator to wear two hats—that 
is, to focus both on the mediation at hand and on any potential ethical vio-
lations that may be revealed.  However, as noted supra, ethical violations 
are rare.  The author could not find any published mediation ethics opinions 
that dealt with the subject, and the first court case that dealt with Rule 8.3 
was not until 1988 (almost twenty years after the modern Code was writ-
ten). 
If we return to the hypothetical, Smith would be required to report the 
misconduct of the attorney for the husband if he cannot persuade him to re-
veal the asset.  In this way, Smith can protect the wife and his own law li-
cense and the interests of the wider community. 
 Rosemary J. Matthews 
 
 
separate standards.  In the regular case, however, where attorneys for the parties behave eth-
ically, there will be no difference between the two mediators.  The issues discussed here will 
only have an effect where one attorney behaves unethically.  Deciding how to resolve this 
distinction is, thankfully, beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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